Creating the Kingdom of Ends – by Christine M. Korsgaard July Two kinds of skepticism about practical reason: Content skepticism: Korsgaard’s first claim: Motivation skepticism depends on content skepticism. Illustration. argue that practical reason is incapable of generating motivation on its own.! Christine Korsgaard calls this view. ‘motivational skepticism’, and in “Skepticism.
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Essays on Practical Reason and Moral Psychology. Practical reason claims that if they are really to present us with reasons for action, then they must be capable of motivating rational person, and Korsgaard call this the internalist requirement.
Essentially, her main ideas revolve around the doubt of how strong human action can be directed by reason and desire as well as the doubt about the scope of reason as a motive for human action which she calls motivation skepticism. Kant und die Alternativen. The Constitution of Agency: Belief Through Thick and Thin. Passion can be unreasonable by Hume in two cases: I want only to establish the fact that motivational skepticism has no independent force.
It is possible to imagine a sort of being who could engage in causal reasoning could engage in reasoning that would point out the means to the ends, but who was not korsgaatd by it.
Practical Reason and Motivational Skepticism – Oxford Scholarship
Reason allows him to admire the rational appropriateness of what he does, but this is not what gets him to do it — he has the sort of attitude toward all his behavior that we in fact might have towards the involuntary well-functioning of our bodies.
Affective Perception and Rational Motivation. And we are moved by the perception of the causal connection only if there is a motive that exists previously in a case of event.
Content skepticism about practical reason is doubt about the bearing of rational considerations on the activities of deliberation and choice. Benjamin Kiesewetter – – Philosophical Quarterly 66 But the internalism requirement does not imply that nothing can interfere with this motivational transmission. Huaping Wang – – Frontiers of Philosophy in China 6 3: James Skidmore – – Philosophical Studies 2: More to the point, what this kind of case shows is that for Williams as for Hume, the motivational skepticism depends on what Korsgaard calls the “content skepticism”.
Conflicting Views on Practical Reason. As Nagel points out, this approach also characterizes the moral philosophy of Kant. Kant does try to argue that we can be motivated by the categorical imperative appealing to the pure spnontaneity of reason as evidence for our intelligible nature and so for an autonomous will.
Against Pseudo-Arguments in Practical Philosophy. The argument that reason cannot oppose a passion in the direction of the will depends on the argument that reason by itself cannot give rise to a motive, and only if reason leads us to a motivation that opposes a passion then it can oppose a passion.
Christine M. Korsgaard, Skepticism about practical reason – PhilPapers
Reasons as Premises of Good Reasoning. Reason is the faculty that judges of truth and falsehood, and it can judge our ideas to be true or false; however, passion is an original existence not a copy of anything: Moral Skepticism in Meta-Ethics.
First of all, Korsgaard says that skepticism about practical reason involves Hume’s ideas about the relationship between reason and desires and that Hume uses desire as means to get reason obey it without telling whether a desire is rational or irrational. Thus, if there is a motivational skepticism about practical reason then it must depends on skepticism about the possible content of rational requirements as to whether this content could become a motivation that moves our inner desire to act.
He thinks that if we then korsgxard able to show the existence of reasons, we will have shown something capable of motivating us.
Practical Reason and Motivational Skepticism
All it requires is that rational considerations succeed in motivating us insofar as we are rational. In order for a theoretical argument to have the status or reason, it must of course be capable of motivating or convincing a rational person, but it does not follow that it must AT ALL TIMES be capable of motivating or convincing any given individual. Rather, their necessity may lie in the fact that, when they do move us, they move us with the force of necessity.
It does not require that rational considerations always suceed in motivating us.
Paul Russell – – In Heiner F. This website is created to show discusstions on specific topics related to the epistemology branch in philosophy. But there is no guarantee of this; for our knowledge or our motives is limited. Reason must be able to produce an entirely new motive, the thing that Hume said could not be done.
Many things can interfere with the functioning of the rational operations in a human body; thus there is practicap reason to deny prwctical human beings might be practically irrational in the sense that Hume considers might be practically irrational: Kant’s Fact of Reason as Source of Normativity.
Internal reasons are reasons reached by deliberation from the subjective motivational set: Kant und die Alternativen. Practical Reason and Motivational Scepticism.
In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant turns his strategy around. And an important matter in Korsgaard discussion in her thesis is the similarity praxtical Kant’s ideas and Hume’s ideas in theoretical reasoning. I will not address the question of whether or not content skepticism is justified. Finally, I think Korsgaard is reasonably successful in answering Hume on kant’s behalf.